The Regime That Needs Enemies to Rule
On July 28 and 29 the taxi drivers’ strike caused serious unrest and political tremors in Angola. The authorities violently suppressed the protests, resulting in more than 30 deaths and over 1,200 detentions. As usual, the government needed to construct a narrative of foreign interference to explain popular discontent and the crackdown. In a coordinated operation by defense and security bodies, the Angolan state accused Russia of fomenting acts of terrorism in Angola and detained two Russian citizens as “proof.” Three months later, the suspects still do not know what prosecutorial measures have been taken against them.
Since 1975 Angola has maintained military cooperation with Moscow. On this historical basis, the commander‑in‑chief of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), President João Lourenço, has a top adviser — Lieutenant General I. Krasin of the Russian Armed Forces — with an office in the Military House of the Presidency at the Cidade Alta Palace. That same general also advises the Chief of the General Staff of the FAA.
The Angolan army is a product of Russian military doctrine and has always been equipped with Russian armaments; dozens of Russian advisers and instructors remain in the country. Why, then, would Russia promote terrorism against a regime it has supported uninterruptedly for 50 years? Lourenço has recently sought closer political alignment with the United States at Russia’s expense, and in 2015 the government fabricated claims that the “15 + 2” activists were plotting to mobilise NATO to bomb Angola simply for reading Gene Sharp’s From Dictatorship to Democracy, which outlines non‑violent resistance
To the Facts
The arrests. On August 7 the Criminal Investigation Service (SIC), “coordinating with other defence and security bodies,” detained two Russians, Lev Lakshtanov (65) and Igor Ratchin (38). The next day the SIC presented them publicly as suspects of criminal association, document forgery, terrorism and financing terrorism. In its official statement, the SIC claimed the Russians were recruiting and financing Angolan citizens to produce propaganda, spread false information on social networks and promote demonstrations and looting. It described them as linked to “international criminal organizations” that operate in Africa and specialize in disinformation campaigns designed to change legally established regimes.
The Angolans allegedly recruited by the Russians are sports journalist Amor Carlos Tomé and Oliveira Francisco (Buka Tanda), the secretary for youth mobilisation of the opposition UNITA’s youth wing. Both were detained on August 7 — Tomé at the state‑owned Angolan Public Television (TPA) studios where he worked and Tanda at his home. According to information verified by Maka Angola, in August 2024 Tanda, who studied chemical engineering in Russia from 2015 to 2019, introduced Tomé to two Russian women, Irina (from Russia) and Olga (from Brazil). They said they wanted to set up a “Russian Cultural Centre.” As a collaborator, Tomé began clipping press articles, conducting surveys on young people’s perceptions of Russia and receiving texts to publish on national websites. His contract also included gathering information on the country’s political and socioeconomic situation — focusing on negative aspects of João Lourenço’s governance, potential presidential candidates and their chances in future elections. The contract, reportedly worth about 800,000 kwanzas a month, included collecting information on the Lobito Corridor and on potential presidential figures like General Miala (head of the Intelligence and Security Service); Tomé mistakenly produced a profile of former CASA‑CE leader Admiral (ret.) André Mendes de Carvalho (“Miau”) instead. Tomé’s total earnings are estimated at five million kwanzas plus expenses, while Tanda may have received around two million kwanzas.
In addition to Irina and Olga, two other Russians known only as Sergei and Yuri, who also came via Russia and Brazil, were involved. Regular contact later continued with Igor Ratchin, one of the detainees, while Lev Lakshtanov acted as interpreter. To date, it remains unclear which organisation the group worked for.
The pressure on the Russians stems from the meetings they held not only with government officials and civil society representatives but also with political interlocutors considered unwanted. Within the MPLA, they met with potential candidates for the party leadership—General Higino Carneiro and António Venâncio. On the UNITA side, they spoke with its president, Adalberto da Costa Júnior, and with Lukamba Paulo “Gato”. This highlights the political interest in linking the main electoral rivals to a supposed international cabal.
The SIC also claims the Russians financed “other identified suspects” with unspecified sums of dollars and kwanzas to promote demonstrations in Benguela and Luanda. On August 13 judge Kerson Cristóvão ordered preventive detention for the Russians and the Angolans, but a certificate issued on September 4 for Amor Carlos Tomé states that he is detained for criminal association, illegal introduction of foreign currency and document forgery — not terrorism.
“Look,” the SIC argued, “our investigations determined that the Russian citizens are operatives of Africa Politology, whose activities include campaigns of disinformation, manipulation of local media and infiltration into political processes to foment subversion.” According to the SIC, Africa Politology “not only spreads false digital propaganda but finances staged protests, bribes local journalists and shapes public narratives in favor of its strategic interests.”
The U.S. Treasury Department notes that Africa Politology develops strategies to weaken Western influence in Africa and push Western countries out. This organization is associated with the former Wagner Group. After the death of Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2023, Wagner was integrated into Russia’s Ministry of Defense and renamed Africa Corps, which is known for providing military and security services — including combat operations, training and regime protection — in countries such as the Central African Republic, Mali and Sudan.
Who are the alleged “terrorists”? From 2014 to 2022, Lev Lakshtanov worked as an interpreter for Russian military consultants at the Higher War School of the General Staff of the FAA; there he also taught Russian. From 2005 to 2013 he was a translator at the Catoca diamond project (then Angola’s biggest mine), in which the Russian multinational Alrosa held a 32.8 % stake. Lakshtanov has built his career largely in Angola since 1988, when he was sent to translate for Soviet technical experts; over the next five years he worked between Angola, Brazil and Portugal, always as an interpreter.
For his part, Igor Mikhailovich Ratchin is listed in Russia’s state registry as founder of five companies — an estate agency, a security firm, an electrical installation business, an engineering equipment installer and a technical consultancy — none of which succeeded.
What links the Russians to the taxi strike?
What causal link exists between the Russians and the taxi drivers’ strike over fuel price increases? The only allegation appears to be that Carlos Tomé had a copy of a communiqué from the National Taxi Drivers Association (ANATA) on his computer a few days earlier. That communiqué, already widely circulating on social media, urged members to stay home and park their vehicles during the strike: “Real taxi drivers stay at home.” This is the second time Tomé has been detained. On November 11, 2021, while reporting for Radio Essencial, he was detained for 48 hours while covering a youth protest during which police killed young protester Inocêncio Matos.
Given Russia’s half‑century presence in Angola’s defence and security organs, the authorities’ invocation of Russians as destabilizing factors recalls the May 27, 1977, massacre. At that time President Agostinho Neto and his inner circle accused the Soviet Union, Angola’s main ally, of supporting an alleged coup attempt by Nito Alves’s faction. That propaganda justified a slaughter of tens of thousands of Angolans and covered up purges within the MPLA leadership, government and security organs to centralize and consolidate Neto’s power. Ironically, in 1979 Neto died in the Soviet Union, where he was undergoing medical treatment.
Conclusion: Who is the enemy?
The events of July 28 and 29 2024 represent the largest killing of civilians by government authorities in repressing popular unrest since May 27, 1977. If in the past Angola’s regime accused the West, today it accuses Moscow. The plot is recycled: when the people protest, the regime needs a foreign scapegoat. It is never the government’s fault; it is never hunger, poverty or bad governance. It is always “someone from outside.” The tragic truth is that in Angola the enemy is never the interfering and looting foreigner — that one is welcomed with honours and contracts and silence. The enemy is always the Angolan who thinks.
In the end, it is not Moscow that rules Angola: it is the fear of Angolans that still rules its leaders. When there are no more foreigners to blame, the regime will have to face its own reflection.